T he use of words by an indi vidu al or cu ltu re is subject to the very same psych o lo g ica l fo rces that d ri ve man 's o t her activities . H ence , th e h isto r y of a word 's usage becomes a telling record of the mental processes of its creators and users, both co nscious a nd unconscious. Ety mology, as Freud has observed in hi s dreambook (1900), co ntr ib utes sig n ifica n t ly to our unde rstand ing of the deeper la ye rs of th e ps ych e . Let us take th e word " r iva l," fo r exam p le, and see how we may make use of e ty mo logica l data. It is d eri ved from the La tin " riva lis," I which o riginall y meant "one sh aring a st rea m" o r "neig hbor, companion, aid" (Oxford English Dictiona ry, 197 1; Sh ip ley, 1984 , p. 333). W he n Sha kespeare has Bernardo say :
I f yo u d o meet H o ra tio and Marcell us ,
The riva ls of m y wat ch , bid th em mak e ha ste (Ha mlet, Act 1, Sc. i, [11] [12] [13] [14] "rival" is used in j us t this sense : co m pa n io n, helpmee t, co lleague. Yet this meanin g is now obs o lete. Today to d eclare so meone a ri val is to b ran d him o r h e r a com pe tito r, so meo ne with wh om o ne str uggles, a foe, an enemy. The in e vit abl e dark side o f hum an rel a tions is th us re veal ed: proximity implies dange r , friends may be tray, nei ghbo rs a ttac k. In psychotherapy, words are p o werful ve hicles of e motio n. Despite the in e vit abl e imp recisio n of a ny la ng uage (see Groddeck , 1977) , th e articulation o f one's t ho ughts and fee lings remains th e primary too l fo r ins ight-oriented psychotherapy. As Freud ha s d ecl ared, " Wor ds a re th e most im portant media by wh ich o ne man seeks to b r ing hi s influe nce to bear on a nother" (1890, p. 292) .
And " mere" words in turn ca n exert th eir ow n effec t o n their users. The formal structure of a word, th e associatio ns it brin gs to one's mind , the overt meaning wh ich a give n cu lt ure has assigned to it , and, sig n ifica n t ly, its covert lin ks b y d in t of sound, form an d e ty mo logy to a host of o ther words a nd cu ltural a rtifac ts which may appear su per ficia lly un rel at ed-all of these contribute to mo lding one 's o wn th ought o r pe rsp ective , a lbeit in ways no t readily evident. Groddeck (1977) unh esita t ingl y sp eaks of "the in vin cibl e cla ims by which language enslaves o ur th o ugh t an d acti on " (p, 249).
Suffi ce it to say t hat t he cho ice of a wo rd to d escrib e a particu lar I Itse lf d erived from th e La tin " r ivus," mea ning "strea m" (Lewis, 1964 ) . 27 phenomenon, especially in the realm of ps ychotherapy, is meani ngful. Bettelheim (1983) has drawn our attention to this very issue in hi s consi deration of the authorized English translation of Freud's opus, and he co n vinci ngly shows how the misrendering of Freud's words has itself created a nd fo ste red erroneous thinking in English readers, spawning further mi sapplications to th e detriment of psychoanalysis. 1 offer the above as a preface to a cursory in vestigati o n of so me lin gu ist ic curiosities presented by a word which enjoys considerable vogue a mong psychotherapists nowadays: empathy.
When Greenson (1960) lamented the dearth of pscyhoanal yti c con tributions on empathy over a quarter of a century ago, it was d oubtful th at h e wou ld have foreseen the burgeoning of interest in the subj ect that h as sin ce occurred. Today one can scarcely read a case hi story or te chnical paper that fails to highlight the topic. Phrases such as "empathic failure " o r "em pa t hic attunemerit" liberally season the literature.
The psychiatric community has generally agreed upon a de fin itio n of empathy as connoting a shared experience, i.e ., the th erapist's partaki ng of t he patient's emotional and psychological state." W ebster's (1986) d efini t io n of empathy as "the capacity for participating in or a vicarious exper ienci ng of another's feelings , volitions, or ideas and sometimes another's mo ve ments" conveys the essence of its current usage, although one must ac knowledge, as in all ps ychiatric matters, a certain variability and co m p lex ity whi ch ca nnot be rendered by statements that are reductionistic by nature . Nev erthel ess, one obtains the distinct impression that to have "empathy" is rega rded as a fa r more noble achievement for a therapist than mere "sym pa thy, " since the forme r has come to imply a much d eeper so rt of "emotional kn owing, " to use Greenson's (1960) apt phrase.
Interestingly enough, howe ver, "empathy" is a relative new co me r to the English language . According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED ) [1971] , it emerged as late as 1912; but even more intriguing is the fact that its original meaning was noticeably and importantly different from th e one to whi ch we are now accustomed. Its first recorded English usage warrants quotation in full:
[Lipps] propounded the theory that the appreciation of a wo rk of art depended upon the capacity of the sp ectator to project hi s own personality into the object of contemplation. One had to 'feel on esel f into it' . . . This mental process he called by the nam e of Einfuhlung, or, as it has been translated, Empathy (OED, 1971 , Supplement) "Empathy," as h ere described, is clearly r eve aled to be an essen tia lly narcissistic phenomenon: the subject has projected his own personality into th e object to be 2Fo r an introduction to the now-formidable lit erature on e m pa thy, see Creensori's exce lle n t article (1960), as well as that o f Post (1980) , wh ich provid es a n interesting revi ew.
understood, which consequently acts as a sort o f mirror, refl ecti n g back aspects originating from the subject. Webster (1986, p . 2317) ad d itio na lly notes that the term is "frequently employed with reference to a nonhuman object " (my ital ics), and that it possesses the least emotional content of an y of th e synonyms of "sympathy," in keeping with its fundamentall y narcissisti c legacy. T his should come as a surprise, given its current employment to represent a sort of apex of non-narcissistic understanding, wherein the therapist ostensibly tran scends th e limitations of self-interest to immerse himself in th e patient's e motiona l world.
As in the case of " r iva l," whose linguisti c history revea led to us the unconscious identification of friend with foe, so with " empath y" : th e opposites of narcissism and, for want ofa better term, non-narcissism are embraced by one and the same word. Such paradoxes are a hallmark of primary p rocess t hink ing (see Freud, 1900, p. 318; 1910) . Yet this curious historical transformatio n of th e meaning of "empathy" also emphasizes a general and fundamen ta l pa rad ox posed by the human quest for knowledge: that man 's understanding of his surroundings (which include his fellow men) is both predicated upon an d limited by the narcissistic projection of personal cha racte r istics, mental and emotional. Freud succinctly illustrated the dilemma when he di scu ssed th e bi rth of t he idea of consciousness. He observed that Without any special reflection we attribute to e ve ryone el se o ur own constitution and therefore our own consciousn ess as well , and th at this identification is a sine qua non of our understanding. T his inference (or this identification) was formerly extended by the ego to other human beings, to animals, plants, inanimate o bjects a nd to the world at large, and proved serviceable so long as th eir sim ilari ty to the individual ego was overwhelmingly great; but it becomes more untrustworthy in proportion as the difference between t he eg o and these "others" widened (1915, p. 169).
For example, b y endowing animals with human fea tures and mo tives, primitive man's understanding and ultimately hi s su r vival a mong th em was aided. Yet, as we well know today, a scientific study of anim al behavior necessarily eschews such anthropomorphism, r ecognizing there in a most de finite barrier to further knowledge. 1 believe that this very issue , nam el y, th e ro le of narcissism in man's search for the truths of Nature, is o ne of th e most crucial for the history of science.
In the therapeutic setting the therapist must guard against tende ncies to project his own ideas or emotional states onto th e patient, lest he fa lsify the latter's experiences and communications. Simply speaking, the more t he patient functions as the therapist's mirror, the less actual truth about th e patient will be perceived b y the therapist. Thus the most understanding th erapist is o ne whose projective distortions are kept to an absolute minimum .
As psychotherapists who are accustomed to attaching wei ght to the alterations and nuances of our patients' language ov er th e co u rse of treatm e nt , we must not shy away from inquiring into th e significance o f o ur ha ving adopted a word whose original meaning so clearly differed in esse n tia ls from the one e ve n tu a lly assign ed to it, th e more so sinc e a perfectl y acceptab le term was already at hand-on e moreo ver whose heritage was a rela ti vel y long and noble one. I re fer to "sym pa t hy ," wh ich appeared in English as early as 1596 to indicate co n fo r m ity or com m u n ity of feeling between persons (OED, 1971) . In co ntras t to " e m pa thy, " it is not a tran slation from th e te r m inology of German aesthetics, but a direct d e rivative from the Greek. In its literal sense it means a " fe e ling with" ; " empath y" connotes " fe el in g in" ("sym" is G ree k fo r "with ,"
"em" for " in").
Are there psychological implicati ons of th e differe nce betwee n these t wo p refi xes? All ow me to offer th e foll owin g specu latio ns .
" Wi th " implies aware ness a nd ac knowledgment of another person , as well as a certa in se pa ra te ness: in sho r t , co-e x iste nce. " In," ho we ver , would seem to imply something different-the d estruction o f th e object t hrough a process of merger or replacement. To be in so rne o ne's shoes, for exa mple, means that the shoes' owner h as b een effec tive ly replaced, or in the langu age of the unconscio us, d estroyed. The five-yea r-old g irl wh o wears her mother 's high heels fu lfills th ereby th e oed ipa l fa ntasy of matricid e as she ta kes mother's place in rela t io n to fath er. L. Frank Baurri 's ma sterpiece , Th e Wizard of Oz; supports th is interpretation: Dorothy inherits th e magical shoes of th e witc h after she has unwittingly kill ed h er. Thus, in a ce r tain sense , to em-pa t hize mean s to us urp or d estroy.
T o be " in" so meo ne's psychol ogical wo rl d also seems to connote a rather grand iose idea l whi ch sa t isfies th e th erapist 's d esires for complete, omniscient understanding-an obv io us fa llacy . Lik e it o r no t, there are lim its to what an y o ne person ca n kn o w about a nother, a nd we must be careful to ac knowledge this fact , st r ikin gly proved b y the u npredict abil ity of behavio r ma n ifested so fr equentl y b y those whom we profess to know well -patients, fri e nds, spouses.
It is a matter o f practi cal co nseq uence, the refore , whether as th e rapists we st r ive to " be" ou r patients, as so me advocates of e m pathy appear to suggest. T o sympathize wit h them in a way t hat allows for the resonance of u nco nscio us p rocesses (Freu d, 1912 , pp. 115-I 16 ) is indeed diffi cu lt enough .
An exam p le o f th e emot io na l kn o win g to wards which we can aim, a nd whi ch I urge we call "sym pa thetic understanding" rather t ha n "empath y," is p rovided by Freud himself. Theodor Reik went to Freud for a na lysis whi le in the midst o f diffi culties during hi s middle fo rties, a nd he wrote of " the penetrating sagacity , the hum an understa ndin g , t he wisd om , an d th e kindness of the great man" ( 1954 , p . 261 ) . More speci fica lly, Re ik d epicted a n e legant illustration o f Freud's p rofou nd ap preciatio n of h is pa t ie nt's hidd en emotional processes:
In the last session I clinked the coi ns in m y po ck et whil e gi vin g myself up to fr ee associations. I cas ua lly remarke d th a t pla yin g wit h money showed my ana l-e rotic tendencies. Freud a nswered serio us ly: "That is, of co urse, nonsense . You t hin k of your br o th ers and you are glad Reik trac ed hi s chain o f associa t io ns a nd ad m itted that he had h ad a fleetin g thought of his brothers, but one whi ch he had not bothered to express, and he marveled at Freud's "fine unconscious understandin g. " O f cou rse, such a feat is possible only if o ne is ex q u isite ly attuned to the patient's e mot iona l state. In this in stance , suc h sym pa t het ic resonance permitted Freud to di sm iss a trite theoretica l co m men t, a nd to penetrate to the co re of Reik 's t houghts a nd fee lings to facilitate insight.
In this brie f paper, fran kly fragmenta ry a nd specu lative, I hope to have directed the reader's attention to th e hidden mea nin gs and uses of words an d th eir potential rele van ce to our psych otherapeutic attitude, using the curious linguistic features of " empathy" as an exam p le . If nothing else, I trust that m y plea for "sym pat hy" will have piqued interest in th e role played by terminology in shaping our thought.
